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Abstract: Oil and Gas industry reported that the industry has highly hazardous environments, 
with multiple technological, human and environmental challenges which have potentially 
severe consequences to workers’ lives, asserts loss, environmental pollutions and disruption of 
security of energy supply. The use of safety climate measures to assess safety performance in 
an organisation is considered as a proactive or predictive approach to safety management. 
There are insufficient empirical studies on the establishment of current safety performance in 
Ghana’s upstream oil and gas operations. This paper seeks to assess the current safety climate 
predictive influences on major accident risks in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas sector. Safety 
climate survey questionnaires made up of 60 items in 14 constructs were used to assess the 
current employees’ safety perceptions. 212 responses from upstream oil and gas workers were 
received and analyzed. The results show that safety priority and supportive environment were 
found to have high predictive influence on major accident risks. In addition, safety 
supervision, management of change, equipment maintenance and management commitment 
indicate predictive influence on major accident risks. The findings of this study provide 
valuable guidance for researchers and industrial practioners to identify mechanisms by which 
they can improve existing safety at the work environment. 
 
Keywords: safety climate, safety indicator, safety management, safety performance, upstream 
oil and gas operations. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There have been many researches indicating an increasing trend of industrial work- related 
injuries, fatalities and asserts losses at the various workplaces in Ghana (e.g. Ayarkwa et al., 
2010; Norman et al., 2015; Bayire, 2016). The economic cost of industrial accidents in the 
country is estimated to be $16 million annually (Norman et al. 2015).  Ghana’s oil and gas 
industry is one of these industries recently experiencing work-related fatalities, injuries and 
asserts loss (Ocloo, 2017; Tetteh, 2017). Studies (e.g. Amorin 2013; Hystad et al. 2014)  have 
found that workers in this safety critical industry operate in highly hazardous environments, 
with multiple technological, human and environmental challenges which have potential 
severe consequences to workers’ lives, asserts loss and environmental pollutions.  
 
Safety climate is the shared perceptions of the employees on safety policies, procedures and 
practices at the work environment (Zohar, 2003; Brondino et al., 2012). Safety climate has 
been found as a robust predictor of organisational safety performance (Cooper & Phillips, 
2004; Andreas et al., 2016; Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016; Huang et al. 2017). However, there 
are limited studies that have investigated the relationship between safety climate and major 
accident in the oil and gas industry. Existing studies are characterised with poor investigation 
of such  relationship. There is confusion between the terms ‘conditions’ and ‘causes’ of 
accident  in the literature. It can be argued that safety climate best measures conditions 
(indirect indicators) contributing to accidents  and not causes (direct indicators) of accident.  
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Safety climate serves as a leading indicator for major accident risk. There are limited 
empirical studies on prevailing conditions that could contribute to major accident risks in 
Ghana’s upstream oil and gas sector. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the current safety climate constructs that could predict 
major accidents risks in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas sector. Ghana’s upstream oil and gas 
sector (exploration and production sector) strategically contributes to the country’s energy 
needs and assert of high value to its local economy. There is the need to know and understand 
the  prevailing human and organisational conditions that could provide ‘early warning’ of 
potential safety system failures in the industry. Exposing these conditions would  help 
managers to put corrective measures in place to avoid possible future major incidents in the  
Ghana oil and gas industry. Overall, this study contributes to the development of safety 
climate as a leading major accident risk indicator. 
 
The paper is organised as follows: the next section reviews safety climate as a leading major 
safety indicator; the third section presents the methodology of the study, the fourth section 
presents the results and analysis of  the study, and  finally concludes in the fifth section.  
 
 
2. SAFETY CLIMATE AND MAJOR ACCIDENTS IN THE OIL AND GAS 
INDUSTRY 
 
Most major accident investigative reports in the oil and gas industry (e.g. Cullen, 1990; 
Baker, 2007; CSB, 2014) and  scientific studies on analysis of hydrocarbon leaks  (e.g.  Sklet, 
2006; 2010; Vinnem et al, 2007a; Okstad et al. 2009; Haugen et al, 2010) have indicated that 
human and organisational factors are the main important causal factors. Various studies have 
established that culture is the main driver and predictor of shaping organisational safety 
performance (Flin et al., 2000). However, given the conceptual challenges of measuring 
safety culture (Guldenmund, 2000; 2007; Glenton & Stantan, 2000), most studies have used 
the term safety climate to describe the tangible outputs or indicators of an organization’s 
safety culture. Safety climate’ has been established in the literature as an indicator that 
predicts organisational safety performance. However, many of the existing safety climate 
assessment relating to the high-risk industries focus on personal safety indicators which have 
limited scope to capture proactive indicators of major accident risk factors.   
 
 
2.1 Organizational Climate 
 
Organisational climate is defined as the workers’ perception of work environment events and 
the expectations that the organisation has of workplace behaviour, attitudes, and norms 
(Ostroff et al., 2003). According to Schneider (1990), organisation climate is made up of 
shared perceptions among employees regarding the procedures, practices and the kind of 
behaviour that is rewarded and supported relating to the specific environment in question. 
From these definitions, the key attribute of organisational climate is the shared employees’ 
perceptions regarding the work environment. Zohar (2000) argues that this attribute emerges 
as a group-level property which actually develops from individual members’ experiences and 
perceptions of the work environment and progressively become socially shared. According to 
Schneider (1975), organisational climate arises through individual perceptions of order in the 
workplace and also through the creation of new order by inferring from what is perceived. It 
is a multidimensional construct that is made up of individual evaluation of the work 
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environment. Organisational climate provides the context in which specific individual 
evaluation of the value of safety are made (Neal et al., 2000). This implies that organisational 
climate can predict specific safety climate. 
 
 
2.2 Safety Climate 
 
The original paper defines safety climate as “shared employee perceptions about the relative 
importance of safe conduct in their occupational behavior” (Zohar, 1980: p.96). Other 
researchers view it as a specific facet of social climate in organizations regarding perceptions 
of the priority of policies, procedures and practices relating to safety (Flin et al., 2000; Zohar, 
2000; Zohar and Luria, 2005). Payne et al. (2010) defines policies as “the organizational 
goals and means for goal attainment, while procedures provide tactical guidelines for actions 
relating to these goals”. And practices refer to the “implementation of policies and 
procedures by managers within each workgroup” (p.806). From these definitions of safety 
climate, the term safety climate is identified as mainly social consensual or shared social 
cognition. 
 
The number of scientific studies on safety climate has been progressing over the last 30 
years. In recent times, safety climate is found as a robust indicator of both subjective and 
objective organisational safety performance (Bosak et al. 2013; Andreas et al., 2016; Huang 
et al., 2017). There have been much focus on methodological issues rather than its theoretical 
or conceptual issues (see e.g. Høivik et al. 2009; Bosak et al., 2013; Mihajlovic, 2013; Dahl 
& Olsen, 2013; Hystad et al., 2014; Rémi et al., 2015; Kvalheim & Dahl, 2016; Bayire, 
2016). However, there are conceptual ambiguities in the safety climate literature which need 
to be clarified. As evident in several previous studies (see e.g. Cox & Cheyne, 2000; Flin et 
al., 2000; Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Glendon, 2008), many variables are commonly found in 
both organisational safety climate and culture measurements. From the literature, there is no 
real consensus on how to describe the climate or culture of an organisation.  
 
In the literature, few attempts have been made to differentiate between culture and climate. 
Culture reflects belief or value, while climate relates to perception or attitude (Guldenmund, 
2000, 2007). safety climate is described as a “snapshots” of safety culture at a specific time 
(Flin et al., 2000). According to Andreas et al. (2016), climate emanates from psychometric 
tradition, while culture originates from sociological and anthropological tradition. These 
differences as found in the literature only point to the methodological relationship between 
the two concepts rather than the theoretical aspects. However, given the limited theoretical 
underpinnings on the discrimination of safety climate and safety culture, scientific efforts are 
required to conceptually establish the clarities of the two concepts. 
 
Zohar (2010) identified relative priorities as one of the key attributes of safety climate that 
emerging studies on methodological issues should take into consideration. Zohar argues that 
operationalisation of safety climate should focus on the nature of relationship between 
policies, procedures and practices in relation to safety which must take into consideration 
rules and procedures associated with safety competing with other operational demands. It is 
found in extant  safety climate literature  focusing on the oil and gas industry (see e.g. Mearns 
et al., 1997; Fleming, 2001; Mearns et al., 2001; Mearns et al., 2003; Bayire, 2016) that 
climate perception variables hardly relate to the nature of relationship between the relative 
priorities among the dimensions rather than considering the individual variables in isolation. 
Retrospectively, reports on causes of major disasters in the oil and gas industry indicate that 
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pressure for increasing production competes with ensuring safe operations (e.g. BP Texas 
Explosion in 2005 (Baker, 2007); Deepwater horizon disaster in 2011 (DHSG, 2011). One 
must compare an immediate profit gain to an accident resulting to concurrently loss in 
production, lives, environmental pollution and the potential impact on the organisation’s 
reputation.  It makes economic sense to sacrifice the immediate economic gain for safety. 
Emerging studies need to consider construction of safety climate variables from the 
perspective of how management choose between production/cost demands and that of the 
organisational safety policies, procedures and practices requirements. This is because in a 
practical sense, a high safety climate perception score favouring management’s relative 
choice for production/cost as against compliance of safety rules and procedures could suggest 
a weak indicator for safety performance. The main challenges in safety research is to find the 
factors and process that influences safety climate. There have not been much studies on 
safety climate as a leading indicator for major accident risks.  
 
 
2.4 Safety Climate  as a Leading Major Accident Risk Indicator 
 
To avoid accidents from occurring, one important strategy is to be incessantly vigilant 
through the use of indicators (Øien et al., 2011). Safety indicators are developed to mainly 
monitor the level of safety in a system, to motivate action, and to provide the necessary 
information for decision-makers about where and how to act (Skogdalen et al., 2011). In the 
oil and gas industry, the common safety indicators traditionally used may include: Fatal 
accident rate, Lost time injury frequency, and Total recordable injury rate and supplemented 
by hydrocarbon release statistical information (IOGP, 2015; Tamim et al., 2017). 
Occupational accidents descriptively are summarized as trips, slips and falls (Skogdalen et 
al., 2011), whilst major accidents are “adverse events such as major leaks/releases, fires, 
explosions or loss of structural integrity, leading to multiple deaths and/or major damage to 
the environment or property” (Amyotte et al., 2016, p.1). There are common characteristics 
associated with major accident cases: they  have relatively low frequencies but extremely 
severe consequences (Amyotte et al., 2016); their occurrences were not due to unknown 
physical or chemical process hazards but in all cases the hazards were known for long time; 
why they continue to occur are mainly characterised by management quality, organizational 
and human factors (Knegtering & Pasman, 2009); they are caused by multiplicity of flaws, 
lacks and deficiencies (Reason, 1990). The controversial issues characterizing safety 
indicators measurement involve whether managing indicators for preventing occupational 
accidents the same way as managing indicators for major accidents, and should safety 
indicators be measured retrospectively or predictively?  
 
At least experience of past major accidents in the oil and gas industry (e.g. Shell’s chemical 
Company Plant Explosion in Texas in 1997, BP Texas City refinery disaster in 2005 and 
Deepwater Horizon accident in 2010) have indubitably shown that the long assumption of 
occupational accidents indicators as relevant indicators for major hazard risk is misleading 
(Baker, 2007; Skogdalen et al., 2011). Lagging safety indicators are reactive indicators for 
measuring potential contributing factors of accidents which uses retrospective analysis. 
Leading safety indicators are predictive indicators measuring potential contributing factors 
which involve active monitoring to achieve organisational safety outcomes. Many studies 
measure safety climate as a lagging indicator to assess workers’ perception of the history of 
safety within the organisation. The reason is that retrospective designs are easier to conduct 
simply because  of availability of previous event data (Payne et al., 2010). However, there is 
the need to proactively monitor potential factors that contribute to the emergence of major 
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accident than to wait for accident to occur and before beginning to investigate its causal 
factors (direct indicators). Given the apparent significance of leading indicators, there has 
been very little development of academic research focusing on leading indicators. Some 
studies (see e.g Antonsen, 2009; Kvalheim et al., 2016) have criticized the inability of safety 
climate scores to predict major accidents. However, the link between safety climate 
indicators and major accidents have been poorly investigated in the literature. 
 
Antonsen (2009) investigated the relationship between safety climate and major accident by 
comparing safety climate results and findings from an accident inquiry in a specific 
installation. The results of the safety climate scores (the pre-incident survey) indicate that 
“the culture of the company in question was “a culture of compliance and learning, sensitive 
of the risks involved and highly oriented towards safety” (p.247). The results obtained from 
the inquiry after the accident show an inverse assocation with the safety climate scores. In a 
similar study, Kvalheim et al.( 2016) investigated the ability of safety climate measurements 
to assess the risk of major accident in the Norwegian offshore oil and gas operations. The 
study was conducted in three installations and the results were inclusive.  In installtion A and 
C, positive safety climate scores were interpretated as acceptable and which did not attract 
further attention from the management for corrective measures. In installtion B, the results 
show a negative develeopment which could suggest that the safety conditions were 
deteriorating. The results of these studies were methodologically challenged. The studies only 
focused on few cases  under one construct of safety climate. However, if more cases were 
investigated with more constructs the results could have been signifficantly different. 
 
Contrarily, in the work of Payne et al. (2010), which investigeted  the lagging and leading 
effects of safety climate assessment on the major acident risk resultantly gave a different 
perspective. The results indicated that safety climate perceptions (good routine housekeeping, 
the prevention of backlogs, and prompt correction of health and safety issues) were important 
predictors of major accident in a chemical process industry. Morever, in the works of  
Vinnem et al. (2010) and Kongsvik et al. (2011) on hydrocarbon leaks analysis, safety 
climate results were found to be a leading indicator for major accident risks. One could draw 
support from the ‘Swiss cheese model’ of accident causation (Reason, 1990), ‘failed 
defences’  is the most promising for effective prevention of organisational accident.  The 
gaps in the defences emerge from active failures (ie. those unsafe acts such as error and /or 
procedural violations)  and latent conditions (e.g. high workload, time pressure, inadequate 
skills, experience and poor equipment etc.). These latent conditions mostly exist within the 
defences for a long period and may be exposed by systems auditing or occurrence of 
incidents (Reason, 1990; 2016). Some studies have developed safety climate variables by 
capturing those elements of active failures and  latent conditions to measure organisational 
safety performance (see e.g. Mearns et al., 1997; Fleming, 2001; Mearns et al., 2001; Mearns 
et al., 2003; Bayire, 2016).  Safety climate perception reflects a distal antecedent of safety  
behaviour which is mediated by the more proximal drivers of safety performance (Zohar, 
2010). By implication, safety climate can be used as a proactive measure to identify the 
organisational latent conditions of major accidents and also prevent organisational 
shortcomings from becoming the root cause of future accidents. Having established the 
measures about the failed defences, one could provide possible predictive indicators of the 
likehood of accidents.  Again, what is more important is to develop safety climate scales that 
are valid and reliable to measure predictive conditions of major accident risks. 
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2.5 Dimensionality of Safety Climate 
 
As a result of the multi-dimensional nature of safety climate, there is no universal accepted 
dimensions to measure it. In many review studies (see e.g. Guldenmund, 2000, 2007; Gao et 
al., 2016), the emphasis is placed on the validity of the constructs and its robust prediction of 
an organisational safety climate. On the development of safety climate constructs, the  
relatiuonship between occupational accidents and major accidents variables have not received 
much attention in the literature. The conditions that predict occupational accidents and major 
accidents are not the same because there are different nature of hazards emergence.  
 
Table 1 presents constructs found in the literature which are relevant in influencing major 
accident risks in the uptream oil and gas indutry.  In most major accident cases, most studies 
have found these constructs as imporant indicators contributing to major accidents in high-
risk industries: However,  ‘causes’ and ‘conditions’ of major accidents have not been 
clarified in the literature. Safety climate is considered as a distal antecedent of organisational 
safety outcome. This paper holds the view that safety climate dimensions are more skewed to 
reflect conditions that potentially contribute to predicting major accidents at the work 
environment.  
 
Table 1: Safety Climate Dimensions for Major Accidents Risks 
Constructs Literature Source 
Safety policies Payne et al., 2010; Baker, 2007 
Safety priority Zohar, 1980;  Kvalheim et al., 2016;  Høivik et al. 2013 
Safety training Hopkins, 2000; Baker, 2007; CSB, 2014; Høivik et al. 2013; Kvalheim 
et al., 2016; Yuang, et al., 2017 
Management commitment Zohar, 1980; Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2010; Kines, et al., 2011 
Safety rules & procedures Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2010; Hopkins, 2011; Neal et al., 2000 
Management of change Baker, 2007; Sklet et al., 2010 
Safety communication Sklet et al., 2010; Kines, et al., 2011; Skogdalen & Vinnem, 2012 
Equipment maintenance Payne et al., 2010;  Baker, 2007 
Safety involvement Høivik et al. 2013; Kvalheim et al., 2016 
Safety supervision Baker, 2007; Bhasi, 2010; Kvalheim et al., 2016 
Supportive environment Baker, 2007; Payne et al., 2010 
Safety empowerement Shannon et al., 1997; Baker, 2007; Kines et al., 2011; Wurzelbacher & 
Jin, 2011 
Safety motivation Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2010; Kvalheim et al., 2016; Høivik 
et al. 2013 
Safety behaviour Bayire, 2016;  Huang et al., 2017 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Sample and Procedures 
 
The sample was drawn from a full time workforce in the Ghanaian upstream oil and gas 
sector from five companies.  The survey questionnaires were distributed to 250 employees 
which eventually had a response rate of 84.8% (N = 212). Table 2 summarises the 
demographic details of the participants used for the study. 72.1% of the participants were 
male, while 27.8% were female. The mean age range of the sample was 3.0 (30-39 years). 
The job functioning category of the workers include: engineering professionals 
maintenance/craft technicians, operators, full time HSE employees, operation management, 
contractors and maintenance management. More than half (50.5%) of the participants had 
Bachelor degree qualification. In terms of area of operation, 65.6% of the participants work 
in offshore, while 30.7% work in onshore. 57.1% of the participants were reported to have 
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experienced occupational accidents/injuries at their respective work environment, whiles 
36% had no accident/injuries experience.  
  
Table 2: Demographic Information of the Participants 
Variable                                                                    Frequency (N=212)                                Percentage (100%) 
Gender       
     Male                                                                                        153                                                      72.1 
     Female                                                                                      59                                                      27.8       
Age 
     Under 25                                                                                     5                                                        2.4 
     25 - 29                                                                                       53                                                      25 
     30 – 39                                                                                      94                                                      44.3           
     40 – 49                                                                                      56                                                      26.4 
     50 or above                                                                                 4                                                        1.9                              
Job functioning Category 
     Engineering professionals                                                        90                                                      42.5 
     Maintenance/craft technicians                                                 41                                                      19.3 
     Operators                                                                                  10                                                       4.7 
     Full time HSE employees                                                          16                                                       7.6 
     Operation management                                                            26                                                      12.3 
     Contractors                                                                                 7                                                       3.3 
     Maintenance Management                                                        22                                                     10.4 
Education qualification 
     SSCE                                                                                         5                                                          2.5 
     Diploma                                                                                  24                                                        11.3 
    Bachelor Degree                                                                    107                                                       50.5 
    Master Degree                                                                         70                                                       33 
    Doctoral  Degree                                                                      6                                                          2.8      
Area of operation 
    Offshore                                                                                  139                                                      65.6                                                                       
    Onshore                                                                                    65                                                      30.7 
Experience of occupational accidents/injuries 
    Yes                                                                                          121                                                      57.1 
    No                                                                                             78                                                      36.8 
 
The selected organisations were contacted through a letter seeking approval for this study to 
be undertaken. The survey questionnaires including the participant information sheet and 
informed consent  forms all in envelops were presented to the companies’ reception desks 
after approval had been granted for this study. Participation in the study was made voluntary 
and respondents could discontinue his participation without giving reasons. The returned 
questionnaired were sealed. It takes 20-30 minutes to complete the questions. Safety climate 
was measured at two hierarchical levels of the organizations: work group level and top 
management level. In the oil and gas industry, operations are assigned to work groups that is 
led by supervisors. Scientific research indicates that a comprehensive safety climate 
investigation should capture both employees’ perceptions of his/her immediate supervisor 
(group level) and their perception of top management (organizational level) relating to safety 
(Brondino et al. 2012; Haung et al., 2017). This would help to identify the issues that affect 
safety management in the upstream sector from the employees’ perspective.  
 
 
3.2 Survey Instrument 
 
The research was designed to assess the workers’ safety climate in Ghana’s upstream oil and 
gas sector and this was initially measured by using a 82-item safety climate scale. The 
instrument was made up of 4 sections: ‘demographic information’, “occupational accidents 
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and near-misses”, “workers’ perception about safety”, and “workers’ experiences of major 
hazards”. The instrument contains I4 constructs developed from the literature (e.g. Zohar, 
1980; Baker, 2007; Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2010; Kines et al., 2011). The prepared survey 
questionnaires were pilotted with 50 sample size. 11 items were deleted mainly because they 
were repeated and some items were positively reworded. 
 
The final questionnaires comprised 60 items in 14 constructs: safety policies (2-items), safety 
priority (2-items), safety training (4-items), safety rules and procedures (2-items), 
management commitment (3-items), equipment maintenance (3-items), safety 
communication (2-items), supportive environment (3-items), safety involvement (4-items), 
safety empowerement (6-items), management of change (3-items), safety supervision (4-
items) safety motivation (3-items), and safety behaviour (2-items). It scores a 5-point likert 
type scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree on “workers’ perception about safety”; 
and from very unsafe to very safe on  “workers’ experiences of major hazards”. The scale had 
a high level of internal consistency, as determined by a Cronbach’s alpha of .834. 
 
 
3.3 Data Analysis 
 
The IBM SPSS v23 software was used to perform the statistical analysis required for the 
study. Descriptive statistics and pearson correlation were conducted for the studied constructs 
to establish some pattern of associations among them. Given the large number of variables 
under studied, factor  analysis was computed to identify the latent coonstructs. The data were 
subjected to principal component factoring and orthogonal Varimax rotation. The analysis 
indicates that Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Adequacy was .709 suggesting that 
the data were appropriate for this analysis (Kaiser, 1974). Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was 
significant at [x2 =1005.969, p<.000] indicating that there exist correlation among the safety 
climate scales. Multiple regression analysis was computed to determine stronger causal 
inferences from the observed relationships among the constructs. The five factors (F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5)  were constituted as the independable variables and the dependable variable is the 
major accident risks. 
 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
The results of the statistical analysis and pearson correlation among the constructs have been 
presented in table 3. The high mean scores were found in the following constructs: supportive 
environment (M =4.32; S.D. =.432), safety priority (M=4.19; S.D. = .44), safety policies (M= 
4.09; S.D. = .37), equipment maintenance (M = 4.09; S.D. = .34), and safety behaviour  (M = 
4.04; S.D. = 1.21). It was found that there were negative correlations among most of the 
safety climate constructs. Workers’ perceptions of feeling “unsafe”  for major accidents risks 
were found negatively correlated with these safety climate constructs: safety policies (r = -
.18, p<0.5), safety training (r = -.04, p<0.5), management commitment (r = -.09, p<.05), 
equipment maintenance (r = -.15, p<.05), safety communication (r = -.07, p<0.5), safety 
motivation (r = -.01, p<.01),  and safety behaviour (r = -.03, p<0.1). 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
                 M      S.D.      1      2         3        4          5           6       7        8        9      10      11     12     13    14     15 
1. SP        4.09   .37      
2. PR       4.19    .44    -.19**      
3. TR       1.95    .60    -.17*   .15* 
4. RP       1.88    .32    -.59**   -.04    -.04 
5. MC      2.64    1.00  -.27**  .04      .10     -.25** 
6. EM      4.06    .34     .07    -.18**     .12   -.14*      .28**  
7. CM      3.16    1.29   .04    -.05      -.01   -.16*  .   19**         .20 
8. SE        4.32     .42   -.34**   .18**     -.11    .06      -.20     -.13    -.07 
9. IN        2.47    .96      .11     .01     -.03   -.11        .31**     .22**    .16*   -.09   
10. EP     2.64    1.00    .30**    .27**      .00    -.28**     .54**      .10    .21**  -.15*       .45** 
11. MG    2.75   1.15    .23**   -.02       .06     -.24**      .51**      .08    .21**   -.20**   .42**     78** 
12. SV      2.87  1.10     .24**   -.03     -.00    -.25**      .39**       .09    .24**   -.13    .41**    .72**   .82** 
13. MO   3.62    1.06    .26**    -.01     -.08    -.20**     .22**      .04    .10     .01     .25**  .32**     .31**    .53** 
14. BE     4.04   1.21     .04     .04      -.06     -22**      -.31**      .01    .05    .10    -.20**   -.31**  -.31**  -.28**  -.10 
15. HAZ  1.7      .60     -.18*     .07     -.04      .17*       -.09     -.15*    -.07   .14*     .12     .13       .17*       .10    -.01   -.03 
     N = 212, ••. p< 0.01.  •. P< 0.05. 
Abbreviation of safety climate constructs: SP=Safety Policies; PR=Safety Priority; TR=Safety Training; 
RP=Safety Rules & Procedures; MC=Management Commitment; EM=Equipment Maintenance; CM=Safety 
Communication; SE=Supportive Environment; IN=Safety Involvement; EP=Safety Empowerement; 
MG=Management of Change; SV=Safety Supervision; MO=Safety Motivation; BE=Safety Behaviour. HAZ = 
Major accident risks. 
 
The results for the factor analysis were presented in table 4 which show the factor score 
coefficients, the rotated factor loading and the communality coefficients. The analysis shows 
that 5 factors have Eigen values greater than 1  (Kaiser, 1974) with communality coefficient 
(h2) score above 50%. Factor 1 (F1) has the following constructs: Safety supervision, 
Management of change, Safety empowerement, and Management commitment. Factor 2 (F2) 
has Safety policies, Safety rules and procedures, and Safety behaviour. Factor 3 (F3) 
comprises Safety priority and Supportive Environment. Factor 4 (F4) comprises Equipment 
maintenance and Safety communication. Factor 5 (F5) has Safety training and  Safety priority. 
These five factors (F1, F2, F3, F4, & F5) as independable variables were  selected for the 
multiple regression analysis to determine which factor has more predictive influence on 
major accident risks.  
 
Table 4: Results of Factor Analysis 
 Factor   Score  Coefficients   Rotated FactorLoading (f)     Communalities (h2=100%) 
  F1           F2            F3            F4           F5 F1         F2           F3        F4           F5           Communality  
SP      -.014      .408       -.282     -.165     -.118                 .730                                                              .829       
PR       .068      .128        .375      -.196      .475                           .531             .584                               .706                    
TR     -.037       .009      -.094       .061      .653                                                .812                               .687 
RP       .025     -.513      -.029      -.009     -.150                -.849                                                             .788 
MC     .133       .009      -.138       .074       .215       .601                                                                       .561 
EM    -.078     -.040      -.112        .599      .068                                      .780                                         .679 
CM     .011       .002       .185        .525     -.057                                      .667                                        .520 
SE       .043     -.035       .564        .069     -.095                           .773                                                   .633 
IN       .162      -.112       .086       .204     -.074                                                                                      .441 
EP      .246      -.008        .007     -.049       .021       .862                                                                        .767 
MG     .254      -.033      -.010     -.064       .038       .876                                                                        .790 
SV       .261      -.002       .098      -.036     -.082      .876                                                                        .793 
MO     .157       .150       .236      -.030     -.206                                                                                      .488 
BE     -.185       .373       .247       .198      -.029                .536                                                               .572 
 
Multiple regression analysis was used to test which factors have more predictive influence on 
major accident risks. As the results are presented in table 5, it is found that the model was 
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significant, F(5, 206) = 4.61, p<.001, which accounted for 31.7% of the variance. Factor 3 
(F3) indicated a more predictive influence on major accident risks (Beta =180, p< .001). In 
addition, Factor 1 (F1) shows a predictive influence on major accident risks (Beta =143, p< 
.001).   
 
Table 5: Results of Multiple Regression 
Predictor  Unstandardized  Coefficients 
                 B 
 Standardized Coefficients  
Beta 
 
     t 
 
         P 
F1                                 .085                                                                 .143                           2.165                   .032 
F2                               - .107                                                               - .180                         -2.723                    .007          
F3                                 .107                                                                 .180                           2.718                    .007 
F4                               - .070                                                              - .118                          - 1.785                  .076 
F5                               - .024                                                              - .040                            - .607                  .545 
Note: F(5,220 )= 4.61, p<.001, R2 = .101 
 
Factor 3 comprises these constructs: safety priority and supportive environment. Factor 1 is 
made up of: safety supervision, management of change, equipment maintenance and 
management commitment. As established in the literature (see e.g. Zohar, 1980; Baker, 2007; 
Høivik et al. 2013; Kvalheim et al., 2016), the prioritisation of safety  and supportive 
environment have become important factor that contribute to major accident in the oil and 
gas industy. When management see safety as a value of the organisation, other equally 
important operational demands could be sacrificed. Safety supervision is found to have a 
predictive influence on major accident risks. It appears that in the various work groups in the 
industry, supervision practices were weak. Weak supervision practices may reflect the low 
attention allocated to work procedures and practices relating to ensure that maintenance are 
safe before such activities are initiated. For example, this became one of the key contributory 
factors in BP Texas City gas explosion in 2005 (Baker, 2007). Supervisors need to take 
actions when a worker engage in a poor safety practices and also take appropriate action in 
response to suggestions for process safety improvements. Given that the upstream oil and gas 
operations are technical and organizational complex, and dynamic, most times changes in 
working procedures and practices are initiated by management. Weak predictive indicator 
may imply that workers are not always updated fully regarding the changes in working 
procedures at the work environment. This factor was also found contributing to the Deep 
Harizon disaster in 2010 (Sklet et al., 2010; CSB, 2014). Management always needs to 
implement changes efficiently. Management commitment was found to have predictive 
influence on major accident risks. This comfirms the literature position that management 
commitment to safety drives existing safety performance in the organisation (Zohar, 1980; 
Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2010; Kines, et al., 2011). Managers do not have to compromise safety 
by short-term financial goals. When near-miss or accidents are reported, management must 
act quickly to solve the problems. 
 
As discussed in the ‘Swiss cheese model’ of accident causation (Reason, 1990), these 
constructs found in Factor 1 (F1) and Factor 3 (F3)  constitute the latent conditions which 
mostly exist within the defences for a long period and may be exposed by systems auditing or 
occurrence of incidents. Exposing these latent conditions (safety priority, supportive 
environment, safety supervision, management of change, equipment maintenance and 
management commitment) would help to managers to put corrective measures in place to 
avoid contributing to occurrence of major accident in the oil and gas industry. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
The study was designed to assess the current safety climate predictive influences on major 
accidents risks in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas sector. Many workers have experienced 
occupational accidents or injuries at the work environment.  Safety climate is found to be a 
leading indicator to major accident risks. The relationship between safety climate 
measurement and major accident risks have not received adequated research attention to 
clarify the discrimination between what constitutes ‘condition’ or ‘cause’ of accident 
causation. The results of the study indicate that safety climate measures were predictive 
indicators for major accident risks in the oil and gas industry. Safety priority and supportive 
environment was found to have high predictive influence on major accident risks. In addition, 
safety supervision, management of change, equipment maintenance and management 
commitment indicate predictive influence on major accident risks.  
 
It suggests that managers need to allocate more attention  on the realignment of the 
organisational safety priority and improve on the existing culture of supportive environment. 
There is also the need to  improve on supervision practices, effective implementation of 
working procedures and facilities changes especially on the perspective of workers’updates, 
improvement on equipment maintenance and management commitment to safety in the work 
environmkent. The findings of this study provides valuable guidance for researchers and 
industrial practioners to identify mechanisms by which they can improve existing safety 
performance at the work environment. 
 
This study was only limited to identifying those latent conditions that have predictive 
influences on major accidents risks in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. The 
antecedents of these facrtors were not explored. Futher  research needs to focus on 
investigating the antecedents of those established predictive constructs by using using 
qualitative approachs. This would form part of the researcher’s current  research project. 
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